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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20090757
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY,
a Utah nonprofit corporation; J AMES
GARSIDE; J L.C, a Utah limited liability
company; and RYAN LITKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF SHAREHOLDER APPELLANTS
(JAMES GARSIDE, J L.C, and RYAN LITKE)

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
a.

Whether the district court erred in failing to dismiss claims against various

shareholder defendants ("shareholders") who were merely shareholders in the parent entity and
key defendant, Big Ditch Irrigation Company ("Big Ditch"). Grant or denial of motion to
dismiss is reviewed for correctness.1 This issue was preserved below at R. 170-84.
b.

Whether the district court erred in failing to dismiss claims against various

shareholder defendants who had no pending counterclaims against Salt Lake City ("SLC"), even

l

Mack v. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47,115, 221 P.3d 194.
1

though the district court stated that existing counterclaims were the basis for retaining them in
the suit. Correlatively, whether the district court erred in failing to correct its memorandum
decision once the shareholders clarified, in a motion, that they were not asserting such
counterclaims. Grant or denial of motion to dismiss is reviewed for correctness.2 This issue was
preserved below at R. 170-216, 1047-81, 1172-92.
c.

Alternatively, if the shareholders were deemed to be bringing counterclaims,

whether the district court erred in dismissing the antitrust counterclaim by failing to properly
assess the legal adequacy of the counterclaim, and whether the district court misapplied relevant
statutory and common law immunity to SLC, which was alleged to be an aggressive and
improper market participant.

This decision is reviewed for correctness.3 This issue was

preserved below at R. 170-84, 202-16.
d.

Whether the district court improperly denied the shareholders' motion for a stay

pending discovery under Rule 56(f) in the face of SLC's motion for summary judgment. Denial
of a Rule 56(f) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.4 This issue was preserved below at
R. 392.
e.

Whether the district court erred in refusing to dismiss the shareholder defendants

after SLC's slander of title claims against them were dismissed, and based on SLC's contention
that it could continue to sue the shareholders for unresolved inchoate claims that the

2

Mack v. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47 at ]f 15.

"Id
"Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
2

shareholders might someday bring against SLC (but were not being asserted in the instant suit).
This is a denial of a motion to dismiss and is reviewed for correctness.5 This issue was preserved
below at R. 5369-86.
DISPOSITIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3—3 and -3.5 are attached in the Addendum, together with other
relevant authority.
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from the denial and grant of multiple motions

for summary judgment in a civil case.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,
SLC commenced this case by filing a complaint against Big Ditch and four Big Ditch

shareholders. R. 1. SLC and Big Ditch had executed a water exchange contract in 1905. The
complaint alleged that Big Ditch and shareholder J L.C. had wrongfully filed change applications
on its contract water; that, as the water's owner, SLC could veto any change application; that Big
Ditch and J L.C. had slandered SLC's title by filing the change applications; and that the named
shareholders had "challenged" SLC's "legally protected interests."
Big Ditch and the shareholders filed an answer and counterclaim.

R. 69.

The

counterclaim alleged, inter alia, breach of contract and antitrust violations based on SLC's
disproportionate and illegal role as a water market player. SLC filed a motion to dismiss the

s

Auila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990).
3

antitrust counterclaim. R. 100. The shareholders filed a counter motion for summary judgment
for failure to state a claim. R. 167. SLC had not yet responded to the counterclaim.6
The shareholders' counter motion was based on their shareholder status—the fact that
they were legally incapable, as mere shareholders of SLCs exchange partner Big Ditch, of
committing the malfeasance SLC alleged.
While SLCs motion was pending, and before SLC responded to the appellants'
counterclaim, the appellants amended their counterclaim and answer as a matter of right on
October 25, 2007 under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 251. The
shareholders dropped their counterclaims, and Big Ditch made changes to its allegations.
The district court granted SLCs motion to dismiss on October 30, 2007. R. 272. This
ruling was based on the original, not the amended, counterclaims. The district court stated that
the "defendants" had failed to sufficiently allege any antitrust claims, although only one
defendant, Big Ditch, remained as a counterclaimant. The district court deemed deficient the
original counterclaim, but did not address the amended counterclaim. The district court also
denied the shareholders' motion to dismiss, R. 277, again relying on the original, not the
amended, counterclaims.
Big Ditch and the shareholders then filed motions addressing the status of the docket at
the time of the district court's October 30,2007 ruling.7 R. 1047-1192. The gist of the motions

6

SLC finally did so on December 3, 2007. R. 343.

7

In the interim the defendants filed a motion to dismiss SLCs slander of tide claims, which the
district court granted on September 30, 2008. R. 4634. None of the parties have appealed this
decision.

4

was that the district court had misread the docket, and that it should either reinstate various
claims wrongfully dismissed, or declare that it lacked the power in the first instance to dismiss
claims no longer pending before it.
The motions were logically related and internally cross-referenced, with some being
made only in the alternative. See, e.g. R.. 1051 n.2,1052 n.3,1083 n.l, 1086 n.l, 1110-11, 1175
n. 5. Ultimately the district court denied the motions, stating with respect to the shareholders
that they continued to "pursue" the antitrust claims up until the time the October 30, 2007
decision was rendered, even though the shareholders had dropped their counterclaims prior to
that ruling. R. 2946.
On September 30,2008, the district court dismissed SLC's Slander of Title claims against
all parties, including the shareholders. R. 4634.
On October 27, 2008, the district court denied a motion for protective order filed by J
L.C. R. 4838. Part of the basis for the motion for protective order was that with the dismissal
of the slander of title claims, SLC no longer had any remaining claims against the shareholders.
The district court disagreed, stating that SLC's "pleadings" still named the shareholders as
defendants. R. 4839.
Accordingly, on December 2, 2008, the shareholders filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that SLC's causes of action no longer concerned the shareholders. R. 5369.
The district court denied this motion on July 6,2009, stating that the shareholders had conceded
SLC's position by filing their motion for summary judgment. R. 6339.

5

C.

Statement of Facts.

In 1905 Big Ditch and SLC entered into a water exchange

contract. R. 19. Big Ditch transferred to SLC the right to divert and use the water it had been
taking from Big Cottonwood Creek. In exchange, SLC would timely deliver a fixed amount of
water to Big Ditch, tied to the measured flow in the creek. The exchange gave SLC high quality
canyon water and gave Big Ditch a more constant flow of water at Big Ditch's diversion point
from sources of SLC's choosing. Over the next thirty years SLC executed 31 similar exchange
contracts with other companies. R. 5310.
In 1914, The Progress Co. v. Salt Lake Citf adjudicated a dispute between SLC and the
Progress Company. The Progress Company claimed that it had the right to divert water from
the creek for a power plant, and challenged SLC's right to take water from the creek under the
exchange agreements. A decision was rendered for SLC and its exchange partners. It fixed the
amount of water SLC (on behalf of Big Ditch) could divert from the creek, and in turn
recognized that SLC could take this water "by virtue o f the 1905 contract. R. 28.
In the intervening decades, SLC either never claimed or eschewed tide to Big Ditch's
contract water. R. 1383-92. During this time Big Ditch's service area gradually urbanized, and,
while SLC continued to deliver Big Ditch's full contractual amount through the diversion
structure, Big Ditch turned less water into its conduit. SLC also acquired water rights exceeding
its contemporary or projected needs and leased these as "surplus." R. 6302. It also engaged in
aggressive practices to control and eventually eliminate its exchange partners, R. 4274-75,

;

Civil No. 8921 (Third Dist. Utah 1914).

6

characterizing these water users as "dangerous" an<;

nister" who \\< iM *'«.» .! to respond to

SLC's "muscle." R. 6289-90.
In 2006 Big Ditch filed a number of administrative change applications to change points
of diversion of its exchange water for the benefit of a number of shareholders. SLC protested
and then, in 2007, sued Big Ditch and the Big Ditch shareholders for filing the change
applications. SLC claimed that Big Ditch had no residual entitlement to file such applications,
and further claimed that the shareholders violated their legal obligations to SLC.9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The shareholders are merely members of SLC's exchange partner, Big Ditch. They have
no privity with, nor duty toward, SLC. They can no more be liable to SLC than can an owner
of Ford stock be liable for a pick-up rollover. Yet SLC claimed the shareholders were
"challenging" SLC's "legally protected interests." The shareholders moved i < *; t v>\ i nss T ais vague
and incognizable attempt to harass the shareholders, but the district court denied the motion.
One of the reasons the Court did so is that the shareholders were allegedly countersuing
SLC for antitrust. A countersuit cannot validate an improper suit. Apart from this error, the
district court did not realize that the shareholders had dropped their claims against SLC before
the district court ruled. This eliminated countersuit as a basis for retaining the shareholders.
(The shareholders tried to allow the trial court to remedy this error with a motion to reconsider;
it was denied).

9

The balance of the facts are in the Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
7

Even if the district court properly concluded that the shareholders continued to pursue
SLC at the time the district court ruled, the claims the shareholders had brought were sufficient
to survive dismissal. They properly pled antitrust violations, and SLC could not defeat them
with a municipal status defense. Subsequent evidence adduced in the case substantiated the
antitrust allegations.
Toward the end of the case, after the district court dismissed SLC's meritless slander of
tide claims, the shareholders claimed again that they were not proper parties, as they had no
power to file change applications: the law did not empower them to commit the breach or tort
SLC alleged. The district court regarded this lack of power argument as a concession, and
entered judgment for SLC. This was error.
ARGUMENT
Introduction. The shareholders should not be here. This Court ruled in East Jordan
Irrigation Co. v. Morgan™ that shareholders cannot file change applications. With loss of privilege
comes loss of responsibility, and loss of duty toward those who may be affected by that
responsibility.
Here, Big Ditch is the only entity that could be empowered to file a change application.
That privilege is the subject of a legitimate dispute Big Ditch has with SLC. The shareholders
have no such dispute.

]

East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993).
8

This does not mean the shareholders do not enjoy benefits from owning shares in Big
Ditch. They do. Strawberry High Une Canal Co. v. Bureau ofReclamation11 states that companies are
to protect their shareholders' rights to enjoy their water use. (The district court stripped Big
Ditch of its abilit) to protect shareholders by declaring that Big Ditch cannot file change
applications when its shareholders so request.)12
Inasmuch as the shareholders have the right to petition the company to file change
applications, if that right is taken away, there is little the shareholders can do to enforce their
diversionary rights as shareholders in the company. Yet, little as those rights were regarded by
the district court, there is not, and never was, anything they can do against SLC, a party with
whom they have no privity. They can only look to Big Ditch, which, under Strawberry, is tasked
with shielding and protecting the shareholders' diversion uses.
Even so, SLC has secured a judgment against the shareholders to prevent them from ever
pursuing SLC. In the process, it has stripped them of many of the rights they have within Big
Ditch. Given SLC's strategic plan to control, and then kill, irrigation companies, perhaps this
is SLC's objective.

11{

Strawberry High Une Canal Co. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 2006 U i' 1 * -6, 133 P.3d 410.

12

Big Ditch's exchange contract is like any other exchange. As an example, a city with surplus
tractors and a farmer with one tractor agree to exchange the use of their tractors. New laws
require tractor owner's registration to operate on state roads. The city claims title to both tractors
and refuses to allow the tractor now used by the farmer to be registered. The tractor can't leave
the original farm, which is now urbanized. The city sues, claiming that since the tractor cannot
drive on the road to be used on what distant fields are left to be farmed, then the city is entitled
to keep both tractors. The farmer who helped the city now has no tractor. The city has another
surplus tractor.

9

No matter what SLC's motives are, the district court's decision to issue a judgment
against the shareholders for actions they cannot commit was error, and should be reversed.
I.

T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED W H E N IT D E N I E D T H E
SHAREHOLDERS' MOTION TO DISMISS.
The district court ruled that the shareholders, by virtue of their pursuing SLC with

counterclaims, could not claim that they were immune from suit by SLC. The court also ruled
that the shareholders could not rely only on the lack of required allegations in SLC's complaint
to support their claim of immunity, and that J L.C. could not avoid being sued because it had
signed the offending change applications (and had produced no evidence as to why it should be
immune). R. 272.
A.

The Shareholders Were Immune From Suit Based on Their Status as
Shareholders.

The district court ruled that the shareholders were proper defendants, and could not rely
only on the allegations in SLC's complaint to support their claim that they were not proper
defendants. R. 272. The district court erred.
Generally, officers and stockholders of corporations are "not held to be in privity with
their corporations and are not personally bound by judgments against those corporations."13

X2>

Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, 2005 UT 19, ^ 37, 110 P.3d 678, 688; see Reedekerv.
Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ('"The general rule is that a corporation is an
entity separate and distinct from its officers, shareholders and directors and that they will not
be held personally liable for the corporation's debts and obligations.'" (citation omitted)).
10

Thus, when an officer or director acts in his or her official capacity, he or she is It tin ii ine froin
liability.14 This is true "whether the corporation has many stockholders or only one/' 15
This "corporate shield doctrine" completely protected the shareholders from liability.
The shareholders were additionally iii'irnune because they did i lot "have or clan n [an] interest
which would be affected by the" declaratory relief that SLC sought against them.16 An "interest"
under the i - ^ ratory Judgments Act is "a substantial interest or a legally protectible [sic\ interest
in the subject matter of the litigation."17 Based upon this definition, one court has lielc1 111;11 a
party cannot be a part of an action for declaratory relief if the party does not "own" any part of
the property in dispute.18 Therefore, the shareholders should have been dismissed because the
property that is in dispute is not owned by them and they do not "have or claim [an] interest
which would be affected by the declaration."19
Notwithstanding this strong protection

i

^strict c c , : 'i:u

n <a the

shareholders could not prove their immunity because they had cited only to SLC's complaint.
Concededly, the shareholders' motion was entided a motion for partial summary judgment when

u

Reedekery 952 P.2d at 582.

xs

Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

16

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-403(l) (the only persons that may be included in a claim for
declaratory relief are those "who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration").
11

Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City, 531 P.2d 866, 867 (Utah 1975).

n

Anschut^ Corp. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 632 F. Supp. 445, 449, 453 (D. Utah 1986).

19

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-403(l).
11

it could have been entitled a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. But in motion
practice, labels do not matter. The court looks to the substance, not form, of the relief sought
to define the proper standard and remedy.20 The motion was, in all respects, a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. The district court focused on the label, and confused the shareholders' Rule 12(b)(6)
motion with a traditional motion for summary judgment supported by external documents. Yet
a defense motion for summary judgment relying only on the complaint is acceptable under the
rules, since it deals with the legal standards framed by the facts as alleged (which are the essence
of the plaintiffs case).21
Here, no further evidence beyond the complaint was required: a 12(b)(6) motion, by
definition, rests on the pleadings.22 SLC failed allege how the shareholders were in any privity
with it or had any duty toward it. SLC's only basis for suing Garside and Litke was that they
were shareholders, officers, and/or directors of Big Ditch, which represented a threat to SLC's
"legally protected interests." R. 12. This is an attack based purely on status. The district court
wanted more, but the standard required no more: SLC's attack was legally insufficient.
Shareholders cannot be sued simply because they are owners of a tortfeasor or breaching

20

Debry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 523 and n. 9 (Utah 1992) (Consistent with the
requirement that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally construed, "the substance of a
motion, not its caption, is controlling.") (citations omitted); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657
P.2d 1346, 1347-48 (Utah 1960) ("If the nature of the motion can be ascertained from the
substance of the instrument, . . . an improper caption is not fatal to that motion.") (citation
omitted); see also Papasan v. Allan, 478 US 265 (1986) (In determining whether an Eleventh
Amendment claim will be permitted the Supreme Court stated, "we look to the substance rather
than to the form of the relief sought.").
21

See Brown v. Weiss, 871 P.2d 552, 560-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

22

Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996).
12

corporation. SLC's claims for declaratory relief against the shareholders should have been
dismissed.23
B,

j L.C. Was Not Properly Retained as a Defendant Despite Its Signature on
the Change Applications.

The district court attached special significance to J L.C.'s signature on the offending
change applications. The district court inferred privity or duty from the signature, and then
placed the burden on j L.C. to escape this special status. This was error.
J L.C. signed the change application solely in its capacity as a Big Ditch shareholder in
an attempt to change its proportionate share of Big Ditch water as a Big Ditch shareholder. The
change application was made only in Big Ditch's name and only in connection with Big Ditch
water. J L.C.'s signature on the application was intended only as a convenience to Big Ditch. But
for its status as a shareholder of Big Ditcl1, J I ,(< coi lid not have signed the change application.24
Both Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5 and this Court's decision in East Jordan25 rendered J L.C.
technically powerless to sign a change application by itself. That power lies solely in Big Ditch.
M ; i ; ourt sought evidence, it needed onh

(.

• :te.

Because all of J L.C.'s actions were performed solely as a product ofJ L.C.'s shareholder
status, J L.C. enjoyed the same immunity as any other shareholder. This is true of the other

23

The same is true of SLC's claim that these shareholders' "actions and claims" threaten to injure
SLC. R. 10. Nowhere, does SLC state what these alleged "actions and claims" are. Even if
determinate, these "actions and claims" were in no way separate or independent of Garside and
Litke's status as shareholders, officers, and/or directors of Big Ditch.
24

See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5(2).

25

East Jordan, 860 P.2c

*

- 1993).
13

arguments SLC made below, including its argument that J L.C. (and, presumably, all other
shareholders ) was a phantom party to the 1905 contract and The Progress Company v. Salt hake
City. R. 24. The contract and Progress concern only SLC and Big Ditch-not J L.C. Thus, there
was no reason to include J L.C. as a defendant in the action inasmuch as J L.C. had nothing to
do with either the 1905 contract or subsequent court decree.
C.

The Shareholders Were Not Pursuing Any Counterclaims When the
District Court Ruled on Their Motion to Dismiss.

In its ruling of October 30, 2007, R. 272, the district court referred exclusively to the
original counterclaim, not the amended counterclaim, which was filed nearly a week before. The
most obvious evidence of this is that the district court relied on the shareholders
"counterclaims" as a basis to retain them as defendants, even though the shareholders dismissed
without prejudice those counterclaims in the amended answer and counterclaim, as permitted
by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) and 41(a)(1).
The fact that a party has countersued does not somehow cure a nonmeritorious cause of
action. It appears that in so ruling the district court confused jurisdictional defects, which can
sometimes be waived, with substantive defects, which cannot. A party may appear in an action
and thereby waive a personal jurisdiction defense.

In contrast, a valid counterclaim cannot

breathe life into an invalid complaint. Summary judgment on the initial complaint, therefore,
is not precluded by the existence of a counterclaim.26

26

See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1180-81 (Utah 1993) (citing Reunion v. Amoss, 500 P.2d 512
(Utah 1972)).
14

In part to correct the district court's errors, Big Dit. . iv -^ - m-li. Iders jointly filed
two motions on February 28, 2008, in an effort to induce the district court to consider the state
of its docket when it ruled:
1.

A Rule 54 Motion to Correct Memoranda in I Decision i ("Motion to Correct")

sought to clarify the district court's memorandum decision. R. 1095. The district court's use of
the term "defendants" was incorrect, since the shareholder defendants were not asserting any
counterclaims at the time the district court issued the decision. Only Big Ditch continued
pursuing counterclaims. R. 1047.
2.

A Rule 41 Motion to Dismiss Antitrust Claims Without Prejudice ("Motion to

Dismiss") alternatively requested that the shareholder defendants (depending on how the district
court ruled on the previous motions) have their antitrust claims dismissed without prejudice,
thus simplifying the litigation and removing the preclusive effect of a dismissal with prejudice.
R. 1102.27
While Rule 54 relief is normally discretionary, that discretion is severely limited when the
reconsideration is of a legal error.28

The district court mistakenly understood tliat t!le

shareholders still were asserting claims against SLC. Eliminate those claims, and the district

27

The need to file motions to reconsider or correct would not have arisen had the district court
accepted the appellants' cross-referencing and companioning of motions, see, e.g. R.. 1051 n.2,
1052 n.3,1083 n.l, 1086 n.l, 1110-11,1175 n. 5, and ruled on them as analytical sets rather than
chronologically piecemeal. Had it done so, it is highly likely that the motions to reconsider
would not have been necessary, even in the face of adverse rulings.
'SeeMid-Am. Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, f 14, 216 P.3d 352.

court had no choice but to reverse itself.

No discretion can be exercised based on a

misunderstanding of the docket.
Accordingly, the appellants argued that references to the "defendants" in dismissing
Count V of the Counterclaim (antitrust) dealt exclusively with Big Ditch, since it was the only
remaining counterclaimant. Indeed, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate any of the shareholder defendants' dismissed claims, even if it desired to do so, since
once the dismissals were effective, no case or controversy was before the Court.
Big Ditch also argued, relatedly, that it ought to be permitted to cure the defects the
district court perceived in its original counterclaim by looking to the amended counterclaim that
was on file when the court ruled.29 By the time the defendants filed the motions, both Big Ditch
and the shareholders had the common goal of simplifying the litigation by dismissing the
antitrust counterclaims without prejudice. R. 1098. The shareholders contended that they had
already done this as a matter of law.
The district court denied the motions. R. 2946.30 While one of the motions asked the
district court to review the record to correct its earlier decision, the district court persisted in
relying on a nonexistent version of the record by stating that all of the defendants continued to
29

Big Ditch also filed a second amended counterclaim that specifically targeted the district court's
concerns. R. 1109. Big Ditch argued that the court could not have ruled as it did had the second
amended counterclaim been considered. This is treated in Big Ditch's brief.
30

Big Ditch filed a Motion to Amend and a Motion to Reconsider along with the two
shareholder motions. The four motions were filed together because they were analytically
related. The district court did not consider the Motion to Amend in this opinion, even though
it was filed together with the other three motions, and was expressly incorporated into and
companioned with the motion to reconsider as either an additional or alternative basis to
reinstate the antitrust claims. R. 1110-11.
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"pursue" the antitrust claims up until the time of the October 30,2007 decision. R. 2946. There
is no basis for this statement It is unclear what the district court meant by "pursue." It was
certainly not actively litigated, and was dropped on October 25, 2007, by the shareholders.
The record confirms that no counterclaims by the shareholder defendants were pending
at the time of the trial court's October 30,2007 decision. Even if the pendency of counterclaims
could operate to validate SLC's claims against the shareholders, those counterclaims were no
longer pending. The court erred in basing its decision on the pendency of counterclaims.
D.

The Antitrust Claims Were Sufficiently Meritorious to Withstand Dismissal.

If this Court rules that the original counterclaim was not as a matter of law supplanted
by the amended counterclaim, the district court still erred by concluding that defendants failed
to make sufficient allegations supporting their antitrust claims in the original counterclaim. In
the original counterclaim, defendants alleged that SLC competed with them in the same relevant
marketplace.31 Specifically, the counterclaim alleged that SLC monopolized the water of Big
Cottonwood Creek to control building and zoning in Big Cottonwood Canyon to the point of
wasting Big Cottonwood Creek water (including a portion of Big Ditch's original water right);
wasted other portions of Big Ditch's original water rights (upon which Big Ditch owns a
reversionary right); interfered with Big Ditch's enjoyment of its contract water by meridessly
protesting Big Ditch's change applications and thereby withholding Big Ditch's exchange water;
competed against Big Ditch's shareholders for Big Ditch stock; intentionally blocked Big Ditch's
ability to obtain proper state water use permits in order to devalue Big Ditch stock; unlawfully
31

After the shareholders dropped their antitrust claims, Big Ditch continued this claim, in
modified and more specific form.
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used Big Ditch's original water right in temporary "surplus" sales contracts to meet permanent
state building water requirements; and encouraged others to block change applications like those
filed by Big Ditch on behalf of the shareholders. These allegations were greatly enlarged in Big
Ditch's second amended complaint, and were in large part verified by subsequent discovery and
evidence adduced for other purposes.32
The statute allows one who is injured or is threatened with injury to bring suit. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-919(l)(a). The allegations fit within this broad statutory mandate. The
shareholders' allegations should have survived dismissal, as should have Big Ditch's (either in
their first or second iteration).
Notwithstanding the district court's statement to the contrary, allegations that SLC may
have acted unilaterally are not fatal to or otherwise dispositive of the antitrust claim. Instead, a
32

See, e.g., R. 3080 (Director Hooton Memo to Mayor's Office of August 30,1993, detailing City's
domination of small water company and promise to use "Salt Lake City's watershed management
muscle to deny them water" and eventually eliminate the company); R. 2974,3072-78 (City buys
up exchange partner Butler Ditch, then has company deed water to SLC; inconsistent with City's
claim to title in the first instance); R. 6294 (Hooton Memorandum: City buys up and dissolves
the exchange contract company Brown and Sanford Irrigation Company; "Hopefully this will
begin a trend in this direction."); R. 6305 (Hooton Memorandum: City buys out exchange
contract company Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company); R. 6302 (Hooton Memorandum:
City has been selling surplus water to 30,000 connections and 140,000 residents, including Alta
ski resort and residents of Little Cottonwood Canyon); R. 499 (GRAMA response: SLC made
$20 million in extraterritorial water sales in FY 2006-07); R. 501, 503 (invoices documenting
approximately $400,000 per annum in surplus sales to Jordanelle Special Service District); R.
4274-75 (City watershed management plan reflects a strategy to "[ajctively acquire stock in
mutual irrigation companies with which Salt Lake city has exchange contracts . . ., develop a
program by which Salt Lake City can accept donations of water stock . . . , [and] eliminate the
exchanges and purchase the contracts outright"); R. 5840 (Hooton Memorandum: SLC
characterizes Farr Harper Ditch's attempts to transfer water up the canyon as "sinister."); R.
6290, 6322 (Hooton Memorandum: City characterizes Silver Fork Pipeline President as
"dangerous" because he threatened "to reduce the City's hold on water and influence
development in the canyon.")
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showing of unilateral conduct is sufficient to state a claim for violation of the Utah Antitrust
Act. According to the Act, it is "unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize,... any part of trade or commerce," regardless of whether or not there is any sort
of combination or conspiracy to monopolize. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914(2). Although a
showing of conspiracy to monopolize is one basis for bringing an antitrust claim, it is not the
only basis: one may bring an antitrust claim whether or not such involves conspiratorial conduct.
Indeed, a monopoly is, in its purest sense, simply an organization of one refusing to allow others
a fair chance. As a result, the shareholders did not need to show that SLC acted in concert with
another person.

E.

The District Court Erred by Denying the Shareholders' Final Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Midway though the case, the district court made two rulings important to the
shareholders, the granting of a motion to dismiss SLC's slander claims, R. 4364, and the denial
of J L.C.'s motion for a protective order. R. 4838. Together the two rulings explain the trial
court's view as to why the shareholders even remained in the case: "while the Court recently
granted defendant J L.C.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pertaining to slander of tide,
SLC continues to have claims (by way of its First and Second Causes of Action) which involve
defendant J L.C. and which remain pending. Indeed, defendant J L.C. remains a party to this
action and is subject to discovery." R. 4839.
The pleadings did not support retaining the shareholders. The First Cause of Action did
not concern the shareholders at all. As for the Second Cause of Action, it alleged that the
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shareholders had "challenged" SLC's "legally protected interests" by filing change applications
to use their shares outside the historic Big Ditch service area. While in and of itself failing to
articulate any cognizable breach or tort recognized under Utah statutory or common law, the
count was also defective because it was based on an erroneous assumption that the shareholders
were capable of independendy asserting ownership of either water or a right to use water
separate from that of Big Ditch.33
As noted in Big Ditch's brief (here incorporated by reference), restricting water use by
place or type violates Utah public policy, and is only permissible when the complaining party can
show that the restriction protects it from prejudice or harm (such as depletion of its own water
supply,34 or violation of a bargained-for contractual right, wherein a party is compensated for
abandoning its freedom to use water as it pleases). The mere fact that the shareholders
petitioned the company for permission to use their shares outside the Big Ditch service area is
neither a tort nor a breach, as a matter of public policy.
Moreover, a shareholder in a water company does not have ownership of the water the
company owns. Rather, it may use water under a collectivized contract with the company.35 The
legislature has codified this principle in section 73-3-3.5 of the Utah Code, which specifically

33

As already noted, the shareholders' bringing counterclaims could not have created a liability
theory against the shareholders, and, in any event, the shareholders ceased pursuing SLC.

34

"Impairment" is an important criterion in assessing change applications. Utah Code Ann. § 733-3(2)(b).

35

East Jordan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993).
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grants only a company, and not a shareholder, the right to file a change application.36 Since
change applications can only be made by one with an entitlement to the use of water, one
prohibited by the legislature from filing such an application cannot have such an entitlement.
It is impossible for one that has no entitlement the use of water to make a valid "claim"
to that water. Yet, when pressed, this is the position SLC took. In attempting to clarify SLC's
pleadings, its attorney stated:
J L.C. is still a proper party to those claims because it actually filed change
applications under a claim of r i g h t . . . . The City is also entitled to a declaration
of whether it is in breach of contract with regard to any rights that might pertain
to the J L.C. shares. Mr. Litke is a proper party as he still holds shares for what
appears to be the purpose of attributing water rights to those shares and then
selling them, and the City is entitled to know both whether such ownership
(without the ability to irrigate lands within the Big Ditch system) carries with it
the right or authority to file change applications and whether the City is in breach
of contract with regard to any rights that might pertain to his shares.
R. 5382-83.
This statement misrepresents the law. First, SLC claims that J L.C. filed the subject
change applications under "claim of right." Section 73-3-3.5 recognizes no such claim, and J L.C.
disavowed it, wishing to comply with the law. Second, a water right cannot be "attributed" to
a share. The statute and East Jordan show that title, and entitlement, vest with the company; the
shareholder has, residually, a contractual and fiduciary relationship with the company granting
it the right to request that a change application be filed on its behalf. The attribution SLC claims
is not cognizable in this relationship. It is a legal fiction SLC created to justify its continued
prosecution of the shareholders. Third, a shareholder cannot ever have the right or authority

36

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5(2) and (6).
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to file a change application. This was, again, decided in East Jordan. Fourth, SLC's last claim
really means, "We are suing the shareholders in case we breached a contract with them/ 5 SLC
does not allege how it could be in privity with the shareholders, and there was no evidence that
there was any contractual relationship between them and SLC. A suspicion that one might be
breaching a contract is no basis for a suit
Remarkably, the shareholders5 argument that they lacked the statutory or common law
authority to file change applications was viewed as a "concession" by the district court. R. 6346.
There was no concession. SLC filed suit to harass the shareholders, claiming fear of a power
the shareholders did not have. A party denying the power to commit a breach or tort does not
amount to a concession that a tort or breach has occurred.
This is not to say that the shareholders are not sympathetic with Big Ditch's position in
this appeal. To the contrary, as the shareholders' shield bearer,37 the shareholders can only wish
Big Ditch well in pursuing its goal of securing the right to file change applications.
Ultimately, SLC's objective in moving for summary judgment was to strip from the
shareholders whatever residual rights they had under East Jordan to petition Big Ditch to file
change applications. Stripping them of any status as beneficial users of water prevents them
from participating in Big Ditch's corporate governance, at least as far as that governance
concerns contractual or fiduciary duties concerning proper delivery of water. Perhaps SLC has
plans to seize control of Big Ditch under its plan to drive exchange partners out of business.

'Strawberry, 2006 UT 19 at \ 37.
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R. 4274-75. Stripping away shareholders' rights to question the company's water management
decisions is a means to that end.
CONCLUSION
The district court retained shareholder defendants who were powerless to wield the harm
SLC claimed, and who were protected by the corporate shield doctrine. It dismissed with
prejudice claims that were not even before it, misapplied the law governing those claims as a
basis for their dismissal, and then, in the ultimate irony, used the claims to justify the
shareholders' continuing presence in the suit. And at the end of the case, when the shareholders
pointed out to the district court their inability to do what SLC claimed and asked to be
dismissed, the district court treated this as a concession and entered judgment—for SLC.
SLC's objective in suing both Big Ditch and its shareholders was to ensure that Big Ditch
could not file change applications, and that the shareholders would lose their right to petition
Big Ditch to do so. The shareholders now have lost all access to the Utah Division of Water
Rights change application process through the two district court rulings.
The district court should be reversed, with the shareholders' antitrust claim being treated
as voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and the judgment in favor of SLC being vacated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7,SMay of February 2010.

HILLIP FrrOWRY, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for JAMES GARSIDE; J L.C., a Utah
limited liability company; and RYAN LITKE
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